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ABSTRACT 
Stealthiness can be described as a disposition to be sly and 
to do things surreptitiously. This paper presents a new ar-
chitecture for flexible and secure networking in battlefields 
that enables stealthy and covert communication in the 
presence of node mobility. Our architecture is based on 
the combination of optical (fiber) and wireless links. Our 
objective is to be able to carry on undeterred communica-
tion without the attack/eavesdropping nodes being able to 
detect the presence of any communication. This objective 
is not only crucial for successful completion of the opera-
tion, but also for the safety of our mobile nodes, by not 
giving out their locations. 
We combine the advantages of optical links, such as high 
bandwidth, low delays, low error rates, good security, with 
the advantages of wireless links, such as mobility and flex-
ibility, along with directional antennas for communication. 
From security point of view, we also assume presence of 
red zones, which are the ones controlled by the adversary 
or where the adversary can trace wireless activities.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Wireless communications offer an attractive option for 
many military, commercial as well as personal communi-
cation needs because of flexibility, cost effectiveness, and 
mobility support. However, for several security reasons, 
the devices prefer to minimize communication wirelessly. 
For example, wireless communication is more susceptible 
to jamming attacks and also might leak critical information 
such as location of communicating nodes. Even if strong 
encryption techniques could be used to hide this informa-
tion, it is infeasible to hide the location of the transmitting 
nodes. Thus, the broadcast nature of these wireless net-
works might jeopardize the lives of the mobile nodes and 
even the objective of the mission, since any ene-
my/eavesdropping node can detect ongoing communica-
tion and could sense the presence of troops. The eave-
sdropping  nodes might  even  be  able to  compute  the  
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locations of the communicating nodes and thus endanger 
their lives.  
On the other hand, optical networks can offer high trans-
mission rates that can accommodate broadband needs, 
provide error-free transmissions and most importantly they 
are immune to eavesdropping and jamming attacks. But, 
they do not provide the flexibility and mobility support 
that wireless networks offer. 
Often, one might not be able to control the extent of opti-
cal coverage in a given network area. This challenge arises 
because most of the times, one might be utilizing the exist-
ing optical links. Deploying new optical links might not be 
feasible for practical reasons; cost issues; the mission 
might be temporary, the need might be immediate and 
there might not be enough time to deploy a complete opti-
cal network.  
This paper presents a new architecture for flexible and se-
cure networking in battlefields for enabling covert com-
munication. Our architecture is based on the combination 
of optical and wireless links. This advantage of fiber opti-
cal links was demonstrated during recent conflicts in the 
Middle East.  
Our objective is to be able to carry on undeterred commu-
nication without the attack/eavesdropping nodes being able 
to detect the presence of any communication. To quantify 
this, we define a new metric in this paper called stealthi-
ness – that is the probability that an on-going communica-
tion among benign nodes in the network cannot be de-
tected by the adversary.  
We propose hybrid network architecture and a new Steal-
thy Routing Protocol (SRP) to exploit the optical links. 
The proposed routing protocol intelligently selects appro-
priate routes to maximize stealthiness and minimize the 
probability of the communication being detected by any 
malicious nodes present in the network. Our architecture 
also considers communication via directional antennas, 
which are available today in numerous forms and sophisti-
cations. Further, we assume both passive and active mali-
cious adversaries; a passive adversary can only detect and 
perceive ongoing communication, while an active adver-
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sary can compromise a node and use the node to actively 
participate in routing or other network operations. Through 
extensive simulation and analysis, we show that exploiting 
optical links, along with directional antenna based wireless 
communication could drastically improve the stealthiness 
of the network.  
From security point of view, we assume presence of red 
zones, which are the ones controlled by the adversary or 
where the adversary can trace wireless activities. It is cru-
cial that communication range and routes be selected so as 
to not to overlap these regions.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: we first 
present related work with respect to both wireless net-
works and optical networks. Then, we present our network 
architecture. We then present and analyze the proposed 
Stealthy Routing Protocol and finally, we conclude the 
paper with some final remarks. 
 
RELATED WORK 
Over the past few years, research into ad hoc networks has 
yielded considerable advances, notably in the areas of new 
routing and medium access techniques. Wireless commu-
nication networks have also been deployed in disasters and 
are currently considered the most reliable and flexible 
communications means for disastrous events, owing to 
their flexibility and mobility support [1,2].  
Directional antennas offer tremendous potential for im-
proving the performance of ad hoc networks. Directional 
antennas have a number of advantages over omnidirec-
tional antennas in ad hoc networking. By focusing energy 
only in the intended direction, directional antennas can 
increase the potential for spatial reuse and can provide 
longer transmission and reception ranges for the same 
amount of power. A number of protocols for wireless ad 
hoc networks with directional antennas have been pro-
posed and studied. For instance see [3,4,5,6], where the  
approximate directional antenna pattern is considered as a 
circular sector with radius r and angle θ. Therefore, the 
area where the transmission could be detected is:  
( ) 2,
2
A r rθθ =
 
Optical networking, with its almost unlimited bandwidth, 
is also attractive for several other reasons - most important 
being they are immune to eavesdropping and jamming at-
tacks. Several works have tried to combine wireless and 
optical networking technologies especially to solve the 
"last mile problem" [7, 8, 9, 10] but not for security rea-
sons.   
Previous research on data communication has not ex-
ploited hybrid device capabilities for security purposes. 
They either consider pure wireless networks or optical 
networks to evaluate security. Our novel architecture, de-
scribed next, is tailored to deal with the unique constraints 
and event dynamics of military networks and achieve co-
vert communications without degradation in network con-
nectivity or performance. 
NETWORK ARCHITECTURE  
We assume a hybrid network which consists of both opti-
cal links and wireless links as shown in Figure 1. We spe-
cify the different components of the network as follows: 
− Optical links with the end points equipped with a tran-
sceiver and we denote them as Access Points (APs); 
the optical links can offer high transmission rates that 
can accommodate broadband needs and provide error-
free transmissions. However, APs are fixed and hence 
are immobile. APs are assumed to form an inter-
connected (backbone) with each other via optical 
links. 
− Wireless mobile nodes equipped with power con-
trolled steered directional antenna systems; we assume 
that the wireless mobile nodes are equipped with GPS 
or similar devices and thus, are aware of their location 
with reasonable accuracy. Because of mission oriented 
nature of these networks, we think this is a reasonable 
assumption.  
− Red zones consisting of enemy nodes whose objective 
is to track and observe the actions/movement of mo-
bile wireless nodes; their objective might be more in-
tense and might involve actions like jamming and de-
stroy. Thus, the objective of the communication 
protocol is to carry on communication without being 
detected. Note that those zones that are suspected of 
being under surveillance by an enemy agent are the red 
zones. It is also possible that some other un-suspected 
zones can also be ‘un-known’ red zones if they are un-
der surveillance by an adversary. 
STEALTHY ROUTING PROTOCOL 
In this section we present the architecture for enabling un-
deterred and undetectable communication among the 
nodes. The complete protocol is described below. 
1. Network Setup 
Each wireless mobile node (MN) in the network is given 
the information regarding every Access Point in the net-
work. The information most importantly includes the Pub-
lic Key of the AP and the location of the AP. Since the 
number of APs is assumed to be limited and as the infor-
mation is not dynamic, this imposes negligible bandwidth / 
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communication overhead. Further, each AP is provided the 
access to the Public Keys of all the mobile nodes (PKN-i). 
Well known authentication schemes based on asymmetric 
encryption can be used to protect the network against ac-
tive attacks like false message injection, selective drop-
ping, sybil, breaking confidentiality etc. 
2. Network Updates 
Every MN in the network periodically sends an update 
regarding its location to the nearest AP. If a MN is 
aware of its destination or the path/direction it is going 
to further move on, the MN includes this information 
in the update1. 
 
 
Figure 1: The network consists of wireless mobile nodes and 
Access Points for them to communicate via optical links. Some 
enemy nodes might be present in the network. 
 
Since, the MN knows its own location, it could compute 
the nearest AP from the list it maintains and then could 
compute the direction and transmission power level 
needed to reach the AP. Thus, by transmitting with just 
enough energy and in only one direction, the MN can mi-
nimize the probability of being detected by enemy nodes. 
Each AP periodically aggregates the location information 
of all the nodes to which it is the nearest AP and distri-
butes the information to the rest of the APs. Since, optical 
links offer high bandwidths, these updates would not affect 
the performance of the network.  
Further, to avoid all MNs from sending update messages 
simultaneously, the period start times are randomly as-
signed to each MN. This would alleviate the update mes-
                                                 
1 Since, we consider a mission oriented scenario, we assume the MNs 
often know where they are going and hence, this information might be 
exploited for routing purposes. 
sage implosion at the APs. Moreover, the period intervals 
could be constant for all the MNs or they might be differ-
ent. If they are different, the interval would be dependant 
not only on the speed of the MN but also other factors such 
as importance of the mission, security level of the region 
and others. For simplicity, in this paper, we assume a con-
stant period interval for all nodes. 
3. Routing Decision: One-hop or Multiple Hops 
Whenever a MN has to communicate to an AP or vice ver-
sa, a decision has to be made whether the MN (or the AP) 
has to send the packet directly to the AP (or the MN) or 
use intermediate nodes to relay the packet. In the presence 
of directional transmission, relaying the packet through 
intermediate node not only saves power but also, more 
importantly, decreases the probability of being detected.  
Whenever a wireless MN is involved in communication, 
an AP chooses a route so as to minimize the detection 
probability. This routing problem could be easily solved 
similar to shortest path problem – construct a graph with 
the cost of the edge between to wireless nodes set to 
square the distance between them and then, compute the 
route with the shortest cost (since the probability of being 
detected depends on the area of transmission). It could be 
easily proven that this is the optimal path to minimize the 
detection probability. 
4. Stealthy Communication 
We categorize the communication between the nodes into 
four categories. Here, we describe each category and ex-
plain the routing process for each. For all kinds of com-
munication, the messages carry a Message Authentication 
Code (MAC) so that the destination can verify that the 
message was indeed sent by the sender and the messages 
are encrypted using the destination’s public key so that 
only the destination can read the message thus preserving 
the secrecy. 
a. AP-to-AP: Since these messages are from one AP to 
another, these could be completely routed across opt-
ical links and hence are very secure and undetectable 
by enemy nodes. 
b. MN-to-AP: In this scenario, a MN sends a packet to 
an AP. For this purpose, the MN computes the near-
est AP based on its location and the location table of 
the APs; then it transmits the message to the nearest 
AP. In scenarios, where multiple packets has to be 
sent by the MN, the AP computes the optimal path 
that minimizes the probability of transmission detec-
tion (as described in previous section) and sends this 
information to the MN. The MN then uses this path 
for further communication. 
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c. AP-to-MN: This scenario is similar to the above sce-
nario. The AP first computes the optimal path and es-
tablishes a path to the MN through that path and fur-
ther communication takes place through this path. 
d. MN-to-MN: This scenario could further be divided 
into two scenarios 
- The simplest scenario is when the MNs have dif-
ferent APs as their nearest APs. Then, the nearest 
APs first establish optimal paths between them-
selves and the corresponding MNs and then MNs 
communicate through the APs. This scenario 
could be seen as a combination of above two sce-
narios. 
- Both MNs have same AP as their nearest AP. In 
this scenario, the AP first computes the optimal 
path between the MNs and forwards this informa-
tion to the MNs. Then the MNs establish a path 
via this path and initiate communication along this 
path. 
5. Routing in presence of Red Zones 
In hostile scenarios, one can envision presence of enemy 
troops in some areas inside the network coverage area, as 
shown in Figure 1. The routing protocol has to ensure that 
the locations of transmitting nodes are not disclosed to the 
enemy.  
Our Stealthy Routing Protocol (SRP) chooses routes 
around these Red Zones so as to minimize the probability 
of detection. Once any information regarding a Red Zone 
is collected at an AP, the AP first broadcasts this informa-
tion to all other APs. Then, each AP communicates this 
information to each MN through direct communication.  
ANALYZING THE STEALTHINESS 
In this section, we illustrate the performance analysis of 
the proposed SRP for a simple network with omnidirec-
tional wireless radiation patterns. For simplicity we as-
sume a square network of length L. The analysis presented 
can be easily extended to other networks. Further, for sim-
plicity, where required, we use first order approximations.  
 
Figure 2. Area of overlap for computing the probability of 
detection 
1. Stealthiness of a omnidirectional wireless path 
Assuming omnidirectional propagation, we compute the 
stealthiness of a transmission in presence of an adversary. 
Initially, assume the presence of only one enemy node that 
can be arbitrarily located in the network and whose loca-
tion is not known. If A is the whole network area, then the 
probability of a transmission being detected (PD) could be 
approximated as follows: 
A
AP cD =  
Now consider a two-hop communication between nodes X 
and Z through an intermediate node Y, see Figure 2. Ac is 
the area covered by one transmission. However, when two 
neighboring nodes transmit, to compute the area covered 
by both transmissions need to be considered. Thus, for this 
scenario, the probability that the communication between 
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The first term in the compound term in the RHS is the 
probability that the transmission by node X is not detected 
and the second corresponds to the conditional probability 
that the probability by Y is not detected given that trans-
mission by X is not detected. 
To generalize, the probability that a communication along 
a h-hop path is detected in presence of α adversary nodes 
can be computed as follows: 
















AcP       (1) 
Finally, given the distance between two neighbor nodes is 
d and the transmission range is R, the area of overlap can 








2 2  
The stealthiness is the probability of communication being 
undetected and can simply be computed as 
h
DPS −= 1                                   (2) 
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Figure 3. Choosing a path: pure wireless or hybrid? 
2. Stealthiness of a wireless network 
Consider a square network of length L. Average distance 
between a random source-destination pair could be consi-
dered to be equivalent to the average distance (d) between 
two points randomly selected within a square of length L.  
The average distance between two points picked at random 
from the interior of a unit square is the n = 2 case of 
hypercube line picking [11], i.e., 
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1
2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
0 0 0 0
d x y x y dx dx dy dy= − + −∫ ∫ ∫ ∫  
i.e., ( )1 2 2 5ln 1 2 0.521415d ⎡ ⎤= + + + ≈⎣ ⎦           (3) 
For a square network of length L, the distance can be com-
puted by simply scaling the above number i.e., the average 
distance is 0.5214*L. 
The average number of hops for a path (h) between a 
source-destination pair can be derived from the Euclidean 
distance (d) between the two nodes [12]. For lack of space, 
we do not repeat the results and we refer the interested 
reader to [12]. Thus, using Equations (1), (2) and (3), one 
can compute the stealthiness of a wireless path. 
3. Stealthiness of a hybrid network 
Consider a network a shown in Figure 3. A node chooses a 
path that maximizes the stealthiness. In other words, the 
smaller the number of wireless hops, the larger the steal-
thiness. Thus, for source-destination pair N1-N2, the choice 
is between a pure wireless path N1-N2 or a hybrid path N1-
AP1-AP2-N2 (assuming AP1 is closer to N1 than AP2 and 
AP2 is closer to N2 than AP1). 
Here, we first compute the average wireless hops for a hy-
brid network. Let dP-{AP} denote the distance from a point P 
(Px, Py) to the nearest Access Point. For instance, for the 
scenario shown in Figure 3, 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )1
22
1 1 1 1
{ }
22
1 2 1 2
min
x x y y
N AP
x x y y
N AP N AP
d







Now, the wireless path length in a hybrid network can be 
computed as  
( ) 1 2
1 2
{ } { }
1 2, min










The average distance can now be computed as follows: 
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
0 0 0 0
, ,h h x x y yE d N N d N N dN dN dN dN⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦ ∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
(4)  
The above equation is derived assuming a unit square. For 
a length of L, the distance has to be scaled accordingly. 
Using equations (1), (2) and (4), one can compute the 
stealthiness of a path in a hybrid optical-wireless network. 
Figure 4 presents the numerical data for the above analysis 
for the network scenario shown in Figure 3. We consider a 
square network of length 1000m with a transmission range 
of 100m. We note that as network density increases, the 
stealthiness increases as the length of the paths decrease. 
Furthermore, as the number of adversary nodes (α) in-
creases, the performance deteriorates for both wireless and 
hybrid cases. Hybrid cases performs better (by around 
10% for α=5). However, because of omnidirectional 
transmissions, even a small number of adversary nodes can 























Figure 4. Performance comparision: Pure wireless Vs. Hybrid 
networks with omnidirectional wireless transmissions. 
 
4. Stealthiness with directional transmissions 
We note that using omnidirectional antennas is a poor 
choice for networks that desire stealthy communications. 
We show that tremendous improvement can be achieved 
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by using directional antennas. For instance, consider a di-
rectional antenna with an angle of radiation of 100 com-
pared to an omnidirectional antenna whose angle of radia-
tion is 3600. For same transmission range, the area covered 
by a transmission in directional case is 36 times lesser than 
with omnidirectional case. Thus, there would also be a cor-
responding improvement in the stealthiness. The rest of the 
analysis to compute stealthiness is similar to omnidirec-
tional case presented in previous sections; however, due to 
lack of space, we do not present them here. 
PERFORMANCE STUDY 
In this section, we present some analysis to study the per-
formance of the proposed protocol. We study the most im-
portant metric – stealthiness - the probability of a commu-





(a) Three APs      (b) Four APs   
Figure 5. Network configurations studied with varying number of APs 
 
First, we study different topologies. Apart from the topol-
ogy with two APs as shown in Figure 3, we study two oth-
er topologies – with three APs and with 4 APs – as shown 
in Figure 5. Later, to understand the performance in ran-
dom topologies, we study the relation between the steal-
thiness and the average distance from nodes to the nearest 
AP. We consider two network densities: 500 nodes and 
200 nodes. We use directional antennas with angle θ=100. 
In all the scenarios, the locations of the APs are fixed as 
shown in the configurations. Then, the adversary red zones 
are randomly placed in the network area. Then, the nodes 
are also randomly placed. Each simulation is repeated 20 
times and the average across all the runs is presented. For 
all the simulations, 50 source-destination pairs are random-
ly chosen and connections are established, exploiting the 
optical links where possible. A connection is stealthy if 
none of adversary nodes is able to overhear the wireless 
transmissions in a path for the connection. 
Figure 6 shows the performance in known network topolo-
gies of Figure 5. We observed that, the stealthiness can be 
improved significantly by using optical links. For instance, 
with four APs and 30 adversaries, about 29 connections 
were stealthy on an average compared to around 15 with-
out any optical links. Even with just one optical link, up to 
6 connections could be secured.   
Next, we generated some random optical configurations. 
For each such configuration, we ran multiple simulations. 
In each run, the nodes and adversaries are randomly 
placed. The average distance between nodes and APs is 
computed across all the runs and so are the results (see 
Figure 7). The most important observation is that increas-
ing the number of APs does not always improve stealthi-
ness, especially after one stage. We attribute this to the 
reason that, no matter how many APs are present, the two 
end links are always wireless in any path. We believe that 
by using power-controlled steered antennas to control the 
transmission range, this limitation could be overcome to 
































































(b) 200 nodes 
Figure 6. Stealthiness in various topologies for directional wireless 
transmissions scenario.  
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(b) 200 nodes 
Figure 7. Stealthiness in unknown topologies as a function of average 




There is a tremendous need for networks that could per-
form covert operations, especially in hostile conditions. In 
these scenarios, the critical requirement is to be able to 
stealthily communicate through wireless channels. In this 
paper, we presented a Stealthy Routing Protocol that uti-
lizes a hybrid network consisting of both optical and wire-
less communication links. As we demonstrated, SRP is 
able to significantly improve the stealthiness of communi-
cations by using optical links. SRP is able to optimize 
wireless communications for the best tradeoffs among, 
communication and security. SRP also avoids wireless 
propagation that overlaps with red zones, controlled by the 
adversary.  
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